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I .  In t rodu c t i on
In recent years there has been an increasing interest in the legal status of animals in 
general, and of pets (companion animals) in particular.  The question arises as to 
whether pets should be considered property, and what the legal consequences would 
be.
Generally, the question of animals as property is related to sale or gifts, abandonment 
or compensation for damages.  Less attention has been paid to the status of the animal 
in relation to its possible attachment in the framework of an execution file.  Let us 
suppose the following case: John has a dog, but he has also debts.  A creditor with a 
debt against John opens an execution file against him, and in order to collect the 
money attaches the property.  He also wants to attach the dog in order to sell it and 
have his debt paid.  How should the law view this possibility?  The Israeli Execution 
Law was amended in 1999 to include a prohibition for the attachment of pets.  
Although at first glance this amendment may seem insignificant, it raises a number of 
problems relating to the place of animals in society and the evaluation of our attitudes 
towards them. 
The discussion of this issue could take place on two levels.  The first one is the 
normative sphere, i.e., an analysis of the rule and coping with the problems of 
interpretation in connection with the rights of the debtor, and generally with the 
person that may be separated from his pet.  On the second level, we face the question 
of to what extent this exemption belongs to the realm of the recognition of rights for 
animals.  In the following discussion, I will attempt to explain why this prohibition is 
justified on account of the special relationship between a man and his pet.
After characterizing attachment, and referring to the question of the assets protected 
from the execution, I will deal with the definition of “pet” according to the Israeli 
execution law.  A central part of the discussion will focus on the criteria used to 
characterize the exemption from attachment of pets, and the way the law protects the 
particular relationship between the animal and his owner.  In understanding the rule, 
particular attention will be paid to the question of the pet’s sentimental value.  Finally, 
2I will deal with the possibility of understanding the rule as a defence to animals and 
the influence of the rule on the status of animals as property.  In my discussion of 
Israeli law I will also refer to other legal systems in which a similar solution is found.
I I .  At t a ch me nt  in  E x ec ut ion  L aw
Execution is the process whereby a creditor who has rights against a debtor, may 
materialize the debtor’s property in order to collect the money he is entitled to, on the 
grounds of a judgement or a bill.  Attachment1 may be defined as legal action taken 
against the owners of assets, or those who hold them, in order to limit the negotiability
of the assets and their use, so that the creditor can settle the debt that he is owed.2  The 
process is founded on the idea that the assets of the debtor constitute a security for the 
realization of the rights of the creditor, which are expressed in the judgment.3  As part 
of the execution process, attachment has two principle functions: firstly, to be used as 
a tool in order to ensure the rights of the creditor and to prevent the concealment of 
property by prohibition of transfer of the assets from the debtor to another body.4
Secondly, to enable the realization of assets as a means for collection of the monies 
that are owed to the creditor by virtue of a court decision, a bill of exchange, a 
promissory note or a cheque 5. 
In order to understand the status of pets in the attachment process, it is important to 
make a distinction between assets that may be attached, and assets exempt from 
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1
 Let us distinguish between attachment and garnishment.  Attachment means a remedy by 
which a plaintiff acquires a lien upon the property or effects of the defendant for the 
satisfaction of a judgment which the plaintiff may obtain in an action, or the act of taking, 
apprehending or seizing property. The term “garnishment” would be reserved for the process 
which permits a creditor to enforce the payment of a debt or claim through the property or 
money of the debtor held by another, execution of money or interest that are in the hand of 
third persons.  See American Jurisprudence 2d. Vol.  6 (1999) at 477 ff. 
2
 See D. Bar Ophir, Execution of Judgments - procedures and practices, 4th ed. Tel Aviv, 
2000, p. 237 (Hebrew); L. Rosenberg, H. Gaul, E. Schilken, Zwangsvollstreckungsrecht, 11. 
ed. München, 1997, pp. 830 ff.
3
 S. Mazzamuto: L’Esecuzione Forzata, Torino, 1998, pp.12 ff.
4
 I relate here to attachment in execution, although there is also attachment in the civil 
procedure.  This is what is known as provisional attachment.  This function is expressed in 
provisional attachment according to the Civil Procedure Regulations (1984) and in existing 
attachment in execution.
5
 Section 81 (a) of the Execution Law, 5727 - 1967 [hereinafter “the Execution Law”].
3attachment.  In every legal system we find a list of articles that cannot be attached in 
order to preserve the debtor’s dignity, but also to allow him to continue working and 
in this way to repay his debts.6  Thus for example, it is accepted that food required for 
the subsistence of the plaintiff and the members of the family, bed apparels or 
household effects essential for the debtor and his family, articles needed for 
devotional purposes, instruments required for the exercise of the profession or a 
certain sum of the salary or the wage are generally exempt form attachment7. 
Since in the execution of property, there is a conflict of interests between the rights of 
the debtor and of the creditor, the law tries to find a balance via the determination of 
immune assets so as to preserve the ability of the debtor to continue with his life and 
be able to work in his occupation.  In Israel, the decision of which assets are to be 
exempt from attachment has been guided by a minimalist approach: this means that 
only and exclusively the most basic assets are retained and thus certain needs of the 
debtor, such as education and culture (except for objects of ritual purposes),8 are not 
taken into account.9  Furthermore, the sentiments of the debtor are absent from the 
legal considerations in establishing what sort of objects should be exempt from 
attachment.  On this point, an exception has been made with the addition of pets to the 
list of assets that are exempt from attachment.  By determining the non-attachment of 
companion animals the Execution Law departs from the utilitarian criteria for the sake 
of other values like the sentimental value towards animals. 
6This is clear in the case of retention of the wage for the debtor. Only a part of the salary is 
garnished and some sums are allowed to remain in the hands of the debtor, not only to 
ensure his minimal subsistence but also to encourage him to continue to work, for, if his entire 
wage is attached then the debtor may feel that it is more worthwhile to abandon his work.
Regarding the Israeli Law see Section 50(1) of the Execution Law, which refers to section 8 of 
the Wage Protection Law 5718-1957 that refers to section 5 of the Income Assurance Law 
5741-1980.
7
 See for example Israeli Execution law, sec. 22, Italy, CPC, sec 514,Germany, ZPO, sec 811, 
Oregon, ORS 18. 845 (2001) title 2, chapter 18; Maryland, Code Ann. 11-504, title 11 subtitle, 
5; Vermont Court Rules, Form 34. 
8
 The recognition of religious and ritual needs as criteria for prevention of attachment is 
accepted in most legal systems. See for example in Italy, section 514(4) of the Civil 
Procedure Code.
9 This differs from the situation in other legal systems where study books for example are 
exempt from attachment, as in Germany (ZPO sec. 811(10)) and in Spain (The Civil 
Procedure Code sec. 1449).  With regard to execution law in Spain see B. Cremades & E. 
Cabiedes: Litigation in Spain, Madrid, (1989) pp. 356.
4I I I .  T he  Pos i t i o n  o f  th e  Ex e cu t i on  Law  R eg a rd in g  An i ma l s
The execution law is not the only Israeli law that refers to animals.10  With the 
exception of laws related specifically to the protection of animals, the consideration of 
animals appears in the legislation in various contexts. 11  For example, animals appear 
in laws concerning religious duties,12 people’s health,13 diseases,14 or tort law,15 and 
we also find animals in the law of execution.
In its original text, the Israeli Execution Law relates to animals as part of the list of 
movable property exempt from attachment.  According to the letter of the law, the 
animals exempt from attachment are those serving as tools, without them the debtor 
cannot pursue his occupation, his craft or profession.16  According to section 22 (b) it 
is still possible to attach the animal if its value is unusually high, and when the debt is 
the result of the purchase of the animal.17  The idea that guides the law is the 
protection of animals as part of the person’s estate or the basic livestock18 in order to 
ensure the subsistence and the possibility of work for the debtor.19  This conception is 
not particular to the Israeli law and we find it in other legal systems as well, for 
instance in France, where the old civil procedure code allowed the debtor to remain 
10
 With regard to the definition of what is an animal see for example D. Favre & M. Loring: 
Animal Law, Westart, Conn., (1983), pp.5 ff.; P. Frasch, S. Waisman et al.: Animal Law,
Durham, (2000) pp.26 ff.
11
 In Israel we find the Protection of Wild Animals Law 5726-1965; Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals (protection of animals) Law 5755-1994; Prevention of cruelty to Animals 
(experiments on animals) 5755-1994. 
12
 See the Pig Breeding Prohibition Law 5722-1962.
13
 Animals Diseases Order (new version) 5745-1985, Regulations for Licensing of Businesses 
(Suitable sanitary conditions for the marketing of food) 5734-1973.
14
 See the Rabies Order 1934.
15
 See Torts Ordinance, which deals, among other things with damages caused by animals. In 
1996 the Torts Ordinance was reformed to include the strict liability in the case of corporal 
damages caused by dogs (section 40 and onwards in the Torts Ordinance).
16
 Section 22(a) (4) of Execution Law.
17
 See section 22(b) of the Execution Law.
18
 All legal systems admit, however, that it is possible to attach livestock kept for purposes of 
sale. 
19
 We will see that the protection of the animal as an instrument of work may raise questions 
also today.  See Section IV 2 below.
5with a certain number of cows, horses or sheep.20  This list does not exist today, yet 
nevertheless the law guarantees the debtor the protection from attachment of the 
animals aimed at the subsistence of the debtor.21
The second case in which animals are protected against attachment in Israeli Law 
appears in the addition to sub-section (5) of section 22(a) enacted in 1974,22 according 
to which it is not permissible to attach utensils, tools and “animals” that are required 
for a disabled person because of his disability.23  The clearest case of this is that of 
guide dogs for the blind.24  Here the legislator was not trying to protect the animal or 
the sentiments of the debtor, but to look after the needs of the disabled person, and to 
grant protection of his property essential for his functioning, in this case the animal.  
In both these cases, the law sees the animal as a sort of “tool”, an instrument of 
assistance for work, or a tool which ensures the mobility and functioning of the 
disabled person.25  In the past, the relationship of man to animal was solely utilitarian, 
in other words the animal constituted a part of a person’s property, 26 and its 
importance was determined according to its utility. 
In 1999 The Israeli Execution Law was amended.  The addition of Amendment 1927
introduced a number of alterations to the Law, among others, the addition of sub-
section (6) to section 22(a), establishing the prohibition of attachment of companion 
animals.  From a study of the discussions that took place in the committee that 
20 We find the same principle also in Germany, ZPO 811 (3): The debtor may choose between 
one cow or two pigs, sheep or goats.  These rules are based on a concept of agricultural 
society where animals are the basis of human economy and have nothing to do with the 
sentiments of the debtor or the protection of the animal.
21
 See French decret 31/7/1992, sec. 39. The change was due to the transformation in the 
rural character of French society. See M. Donnier, Voies d’execution et Procédures de 
Distribution, Paris, 1999, p. 91.
22
 Law of State of Israel, 748.
23
 We find the same solution in France: Decret 31/7/1992, sec. 42.
24
 But the law does not refer exclusively to dogs; there are other animals, for instance 
monkeys, that aid people with various physical disabilities.
25 From this point of view the rule reflects the Descartian idea of seeing animals as tools.  See 
R. Descartes, Discours de la Méthode, Paris, 1991, pp. 124 ff.
26 There are those who claim that the legislation that developed concerning the protection of 
animals was the product of a need to protect property and not the animals.  See S. Brooman 
& D. Legge: Law relating to Animals, London, (1997) at 50.
27
 Law of State of Israel 1708, p. 138.
6prepared the law, we learn that there was no significant disagreement between the 
initiators of the law (two members of the Israeli Parliament, and the representatives of 
the Ministry of Justice) with regard to the essence of the prohibition against 
attachment of pets.28  It was more difficult to determine what should be included in 
this term.  In their original draft, the initiators of the law avoided defining a pet, and 
this was in order to prevent the attachment of pets completely, but the Ministry of 
Justice demanded that a pet should be defined, in order to prevent a sweeping 
exemption.
The text was finally drawn as follows:
22(a) The following movable property cannot be attached:
(. . .)
(6) Pets – in this section a pet is an animal that is present in the 
home or premises of the debtor and that is not used for business 
of a commercial character.
In fact, the Israeli section is similar to the German sec. 811c. ZPO that establishes that 
the animals that are in the area of the house are not attachable, short of those aimed at 
commercial activities.  But where the price of the animal justifies it, the execution 
judge may be entitled to order the attachment, taking into account the animal’s 
interest.29  The definition of the Israeli law should be analyzed.  Since its definition of 
the pet is very particular, it leads to some problems of interpretation.
28
 The discussion took place in the sub-committee of the Constitution, Law & Justice 
Committee for amendments of the Execution Law. See the protocol from the date of 
10.12.1998 (on file by the author).
29
 “1) Tiere, die im häuslichen Bereich und nicht zu Erwerbeszwecken gehalten werden, sind 
di Pfändung  nicht unterworfen. 2) Auf Antrag des Gläubigers läßt das Vollstreckungsgericht 
eine Pfändung  wegen des hohen Wertes zu, wenn die Unpfändbarkeit für den Gläubiger eine 
Härte bedeuten würde, die auch unter Würrdigung der Belange des Tierschutzes und der 
berechtigten Interessen des Schuldners nich zu rechtfertigen  ist.  ”It is interesting to note that 
the approach adopted by the Israeli legislator is quite similar to that of the German legislator. I 
talked with M.K. A. Poraz (one of the initiators of the law) and he was not acquainted with the 
German solution, neither were the members of the Ministry of Justice that worked on the 
drafting of the section.
7I V .  Wha t  i s  a  Pe t ?
Even those who do not have a pet cat or dog in their home seemingly know what is 
meant by the word.  However the definition or characterization of a pet may be 
vaguely sketched especially when attempting to pin legal consequences to this term. 
It is an accepted practice to distinguish between “wild animals” and domestic ones.30
In Israel, the legislator defined a wild animal as an animal that by nature is not found 
in the vicinity of man.31  And thus animals that are not wild animals are considered to 
be within the bounds of a domesticated animal.32  This distinction relates to the 
character and type of animal, but it does not mean that a person cannot own an animal 
that according to its nature is a wild animal.  For instance, monkeys are by nature wild 
animals but they are sometimes owned by a private person who keeps them in his 
home, or exotic birds that are domesticated and may be qualified as pets.33  Otherwise, 
animals that are kept in a zoo are not considered to be domesticated animals, but 
captive wild animals.34
A pet (or companion-animal, as it is referred to) is an animal domesticated for social 
reasons. 35  Not all animals that are found in the vicinity of man are within the bounds 
of a pet, and - as mentioned, there are some animals that generally may be considered 
wild animals but that are owned by a person, and considered as pets.  On the other 
hand, animals that by nature are domesticated may exist without owners.  Not every 
domesticated animal is a pet.  Animals used for food – such as cows or chickens - are 
domestics, but they should not be viewed as pets,36 although there may be a situation 
30
 See P. Frasch, S. Waisman et al., supra note 10 at 44 ff.
31
 Section 1 of the Protection of Wild Life Law 5726-1965.  This definition is slightly different 
from the definition appearing in section 2 of the Torts Ordinance according to which a wild 
animal is that which is not encaged or held under the supervision of a person.
32
 See the second addendum to the Animal’s Disease Ordinance (new version) 5745-1985.
33 Hodges v. Manon County, Florida 730 So. 2d. 786 (1999).
34
 See H. Hemmer, Domestication (trans. N. Beckhaus) Cambridge, (1990) pp.1 ff.
35
 R. Huss, “Separation, Custody, and Estate Planning Issues relating to Companion 
Animals”, 74 Univ. Colorado Law Review (2003) 181-240 at 195.
36
 See A. Shalev, The Furry Therapist, Tel Aviv, 1996 p.21 (in Hebrew). Can farm animals 
(such as chickens, turkeys or milking cows) that are held in order to provide for the debtor and 
his family, be attached?  In Germany the answer is negative. See ZPO sec. 811(3).
8in which a person keeps cows as pets.37  The definition of an animal as a domesticated 
animal is in fact a cultural definition and not biological.38  To decide which sort of 
animal should be characterized as pet we may apply to a range of criteria such as: 
whether the animal receives personal care, whether it is related to in an emotional 
way, whether it lives in the vicinity of its owner and generally constitutes part of his 
daily life.39  This list is not definitive and may change from place to place, since in 
various cultures different animals are kept as pets. 
In countries like Britain or the United States,40 we find special legislation regarding 
pets.  In Israel, short of the Execution Law, we find the term “pet” only in the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Law (protection of animals) 1994,41 but this 
reference does not include any definition of a pet.  So the only operative definition 
regarding pets is the one in Execution Law, which is a definition that does not take 
into account the nature of the animal. Accordingly, the “nature” of a pet for the 
purposes of execution of judgments is based on two principles: 1.) The location of the 
animal 2.) The purpose of the animal.
1. The Location of the Animal
According to the law, a pet is an animal found in the home of the debtor or in his 
premises [‘chatzer’ in hebrew].  The clear intention is to protect the animal, who lives 
with the debtor and with his family, from attachment.42  If we compare this with the 
solution offered by the German law, we shall find that there too, it is not possible to 
attach animals that are to be found “in the area of the home”.43  In other legal systems 
37
 Compare Smith v. State Farm Fire (Louisiana App. 1980) 381 So. 2d. 913.
38
 With regard to this matter, in an English ruling, a camel was defined as domesticated.  See 
McQuacker v. Goddard (1940) 1 KB 687, 1 All Eng. Rep. 471.
39
 D. Favre & M. Loring, supra note 10 at 13.
40
 See for example The Pet Thefts Act, 7 USC 2158.
41
 Although this is only as a side issue regarding the matter of legislation of rules regarding 
the holding of pets in shops (clause 19 of the Law).
42
 I shall discuss this subject in detail below.
43
 See ZPO sec. 811c(1) – “hausliches Bereich”; see also U. Gottwald, ed.: 
Zwangsvollstreckung, Berlin, (1999), p.472.
9like in France, there is no reference to the location of the animal, and so any pet is 
non-attachable.44
The very fact of keeping the animal in the home or premises constitutes an elementary 
component of the definition of the animal as a pet, and thus even animals that are not 
within the bounds of a “pet” will be included in this category because of their being in 
the home or premises of the debtor.  This is so since there is a clear-cut relationship 
between the place where the animal is located, that is, in the house of the owner, and 
the existence of an emotional or sentimental relationship towards it. 
The term “premises” is meant to include structures or areas that are not adjacent to the 
debtor’s home: even an enclosure that is located outside the home may constitute 
premises.45  The question may be posed as to whether a pet that for various 
circumstances lives outside the home or premises of the debtor, in another home or in 
a place of care for a long period, may be attached?  Since according to the letter of the 
law such an animal is not within the “home or premises” of the owners, it could 
therefore be attached.  This is the case where the animal is under a bailee, like in the 
event that the owner is on holiday, or due to some reason cannot leave the pet at 
home.  It is not physically in the debtor’s premises, but there is no reason to see this 
fact as severing the sentimental connection of the human towards the pet.46
If we try to protect the relationship between man and pet, the interpretation of what is 
the house of the premises of the debtor should be rather flexible, and, as a matter of 
fact, it may be possible to find cases in which the debtor’s pet is kept outside the 
home and even outside his premises and yet it does not lose its characterization as a 
pet. Thus, for example the home includes not only the permanent residence but also a 
summer home or temporary residence.  And what about the attachment of the animal 
which is kept at the debtor’s workplace?  The workplace is not within the bounds of 
the debtor’s home.  However the fact cannot be ignored that people often keep 
44
 See sec. 39 Decret 31/7/92: “Les animaux d’appartement ou de garde”.  French law does 
not define of a pet.
45
 In American Law the meaning of “premises” will be determined by the context and by the 
circumstances.  See for example  Gibbons v. Brandt 170 F. 2d. 385; Commeaux v. State 42 
SW 2d 255; Franz v. City of New Rochelle 124 NYS 2d. 525. 
46
 Perhaps the solution could be different in a case where the animal is put indefinitely under 
the custody of other person and so the sentimental relationship with the owner is weakened.
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animals in their workplace (for example guard dogs).  The sentiments towards animals 
are independent of the fact that they may be located in the work place.47
In general, I do not believe that a narrow interpretation should be given to the terms 
“home” or “yard,” since in the end it is not relevant where the debtor keeps his animal 
but why he keeps it.  Therefore, in my opinion, greater weight should be given to the 
second part of the rule, i.e., the affinity between the animal and its owner, and its use 
for “an occupation of a commercial character”.  This may raise several questions. 
2. The Purpose for Which the Animal is Kept
At first glance, the question why a person keeps a companion animal seems 
superfluous.  Sentimental values, companionship and so on, are generally the grounds 
for having companion animals at home.  Thus it seems logical to argue that one who 
has an animal for exclusively economic reasons should not be protected against the 
attachment.48  Nevertheless, things are not so simple, since the very definition of a 
“business activity” [‘hisuk ba’al ofi mischari’ in Hebrew] is not so simple.  
A Business of Commercial Character
In principle, when talking about an occupation of a commercial character, we refer to 
a permanent activity from which the person makes a living.  Primarily, this embodies 
an intention to allow the attachment of pets intended for sale – and more specifically, 
animals that are kept in shops or animals that constitute part of a certain stock.  
Accepting that the law intends to protect the relationship between the pet and the 
owner49 it seems clear that people who keep animals for sale cannot claim this 
defence since they lack sentimental relationship, and so it seems logical to allow the 
attachment.  On the other hand, the attachment does not cause the pet suffering since 
it is the same to remain in a cage within the shop or be conveyed to another place, and 
47
 The problem may appear regarding big work places where dogs belong to the firm and are 
kept by the workers.  The sentimental relationship is here between the worker and the 
animals and not between the animal and the owner, who is a juristic person. 
48
 In this point it is clear that the approach of the Israeli law is done from the point of view of 
the relationship debtor-creditor and not from the point of view of the animal. 
49
 About this relationship see below, section V 2.
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to the animal it makes no difference whether it is sold in an auction within the 
framework of the execution process or in a private sale.50
But pet shops are not the only case that can be defined a “business of commercial 
character” and we should be aware that in certain circumstances basing the attachment 
of the animal on its relationship of commercial activity, may lead to some dubious 
solutions.  Take for example a valuable racehorse.  Is participation in a competition in 
order to win prizes for the appearance or breed of the animal considered a commercial 
occupation?  If we give a positive answer, the conclusion should be that when a 
debtor keeps the horse in his yard without using it to compete in competitions, it is not 
possible to attach it in any case, but, in contrast, if the horse is intended to race or for 
activity of a commercial nature, it will possible to attach it.  I think this conclusion is 
problematic, since if we understand the law as protecting the sentimental relationship 
between owner and animal, this relationship may exist with a racehorse as well, and 
should therefore not be attached.
 Interpretation of the law should not be made according to the letter of the law, but in 
order to try to find out the purpose of the law.51  I do not think that participation in a 
competition is within the bounds of a “commercial occupation.”  I do not think that 
any economic activity connected with the animal should be grasped as being at odds 
with having the pet due to a sentimental relation.  But another problem comes to light: 
the limit between the definition of an animal as performing activities of a commercial 
character which admits attachment, and the animals with which the debtor carries out 
its profession, which is not attachable by Execution law.  I will elaborate this point.
The Animal for Work
According to the Israeli Execution law, the question may arise regarding pets held for 
carrying out the debtor’s profession.  As I pointed out before, if the animal is used for 
the work or the profession of the debtor (such as a an animal trained for 
performances) it is not protected by force of sub-section (6) (since it is used for an 
occupation of a commercial character), but at the same time it cannot be attached 
50
 Regarding the question from the animal’s perspective see below VI.
51
 See A. Barak, Judicial Discretion, Yale 1989, passim.
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according to sub-clause (4) which protects the animal needed to carry out the debtor’s 
profession.  For example, the owner of a parrot that participates in performances uses 
the animal for an occupation of a commercial character, which excludes the protection 
given by section 22 (a) (6).  At the same time, however, the parrot constitutes the 
source of his income, without which the debtor is unable to carry out the performance, 
which is the grounds of the protection given by section 22 (a) (4). The same is true for 
a riding teacher that keeps a horse for riding-lessons.52  It should be taken into account 
that these sections do not entirely overlap, since according to sub-section (b) it is 
possible to attach an animal whose price is above a certain amount, 53 while with 
regard to pets, this determination has no validity since the letter of the law does not 
determine any limitation regarding the sum for the pet. 
It would have been preferable in my opinion, if the legislator had chosen clearer 
wording that would allow the attachment of pets if they are part of a stock intended 
for sale.  However the legislator did not adopt this solution, and we are left to cope 
with the various cases in which a pet may be the subject of a commercial occupation.  
As a matter of fact, the gap that is created between sub-section (4) and sub-section (6) 
is extremely narrow and thus there is no point in searching for a niche in which 
domestic pets are used as tools of work.  The fact that a person has a companion 
animal and this animal is used for some sort of commercial activity (or if the animal is 
used for the occupation of the debtor) should not justify its attachment.54
Having a Number of Pets
What about a debtor who keeps a number of pets?  What is the position with regard to 
attachment?  According to the opinion of Judge Bar Ophir, an expert in Execution 
law, when a debtor has a number of valuable animals then all the animals may be 
attached, excepting one of them.  According to this opinion, this is the obligatory 
solution since the defence against attachment of pets must be provided within 
reasonable limits and the determination of this for each case will be made by the Chief 
52
 In any case, the earnings resulting from the work or activity of the animal may be attached.
53
 See the Execution Regulations 5740-1979 section 50 (since in practice the sums have not 
been updated, they have no significant meaning).
54
 Regarding the grounds for justification see below in section V.
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Execution Officer.55  With all due respect I cannot agree with this interpretation.  The 
wording of the law does not mention the number of animals or their value.56  In my 
opinion, as long as the pet is not kept for commercial purposes, it cannot be attached.  
However, in the case that holding a large number of animals would constitute a 
commercial enterprise (as I noted when talking about a stock of animals), the court 
should be entitled to authorize the attachment according to the circumstances.57
Furthermore, owning several animals may indicate the economic situation of the 
debtor and his ability to pay the debts, and this point should be taken into account by 
the Chief Execution Officer in order to determine the monthly instalment that the 
debtor should pay.  In any case, I see no problem in the Chief Execution Officer 
recommending to the debtor to sell some of the pets, and use the income from the sale 
along with the saving of monthly expenses, for the payment of the debt. 
Animal Breeding
How would we view animal breeding?  Can it be considered “an occupation of a 
commercial character”?  The rearing of a female animal often involves reproduction, 
however this has no significance regarding exclusion from the prohibition of 
attachment.  And what should be the solution regarding the offspring that the animal 
produces?  Should these also be seen as included in the prohibition of attachment?  
The answer must be positive, i.e. it is not possible to attach them, but if they are sold 
then it is possible to attach the sums that the owners receive for their sale.
In Conclusion 
The Israeli law did not established the concept of the companion animal according to 
sociological or cultural patterns, but by establishing what sort of animals can be 
attached, if they fall short of the definition of section 22 (a) (6).  According to the 
purposes of the law and in order to provide effective protection to the debtor, the 
prohibition of pet attachment should be excluded only in the case of being part of a 
shop’s stock, where the aim of the owner is to sell them.  Unfortunately, the letter of 
55
 Bar Ophir, supra note 2 at 254.
56
 See below, section V 2.
57
 As in Germany, where section 811(c) allows the judge, in certain circumstances, to 
authorize the attachment of pets.  
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the law is not clear enough, and we should wait until the courts decide regarding the 
scope of the prohibition facing a concrete case.
To understand the meaning of the rule regarding pets, it is important to pay attention 
not to what appears in the letter of the law, but precisely to what is lacking in the rule: 
there is no reference to the value of the animal.  
V .  Th e  V a lu e  o f  the  An i mal ,  and  th e  D e b to r ’ s  S en t i me nt    
According to section 22(a) (6) the Israeli law protects all pets, making no distinction 
as to their value.  This solution is different from the solutions adopted in other 
systems.  Thus for example in France, the Execution Regulations include domestic 
animals and guard animals in the list of articles exempt from attachment. 58  But the 
same regulation determines that an asset that is immune from attachment can be 
attached anyway if its value justifies this, or if it is non-essential for the debtor in 
consideration of its quantity or numbers and if this will not harm the feelings of the 
debtor.59  In Germany, as well, the immunity of pets from attachment is not absolute, 
since the legislator grants the judge certain discretion to decide on the attachment of 
an animal that is very valuable.60  A similar rule appears in some American 
jurisdictions, which recognize the exemption of attachment of pets, but nonetheless 
establish a monetary limit.61
In my opinion, the solution that was adopted by the Israeli legislator is justified, both 
from the point of view of the debtor’s sentiments and from the point of view of the 
animal, as will be discussed presently.
58
 Section 39 of the Regulations from July 31st 1992.  See J.Vincent & J. Prévault, Voies 
d’Execution et Procédures de Distribution, Paris (1995) pp. 74 ff.
59
 See section 39 above.
60
 See ZPO 811c(2) that gives discretion to the Execution judge to allow the attachment of an 
animal according to the request of the creditor if the value is high enough to justify this, if the 
non-attachment is liable to cause difficulty to the creditor and in consideration of the need to 
protect the debtor and his interests. 
61
 See for example, Oregon Revised Statutes, 18.845 (2001) establishing that domestic 
animals are exempt of attachment at a value not exceeding $ 1000; Maryland, pet exempt up 
to $500 (Annotated Code of Maryland 11-504).
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1. Valuable and Valueless Animals
According to the explanations that were included in the draft law, the drafters did not 
intend to ignore the price of the animal: “ [. . .] There is nothing in this draft to 
prevent the attachment of creatures that are not companion animals, and which have a 
substantial economic value.”62  Conforming to this, the intention was to distinguish 
between expensive pets and pets without monetary value, but this intention did not 
receive any expression in the Israeli law.  The lawmaker preferred the use of the 
formula “business of commercial character,” which clearly does not include a 
reference to the market value of the animal. 
In order to understand this lack of reference to the price of the animal we should take 
a step back and refer to the reasons that generally justify exempting certain assets 
from attachment.63  These are basically two: 
1) Injury to the basic needs of the debtor 
2) Lack of tangible benefit to the creditor
It seems quite logical that the attachment should not be justified when the sale of the 
assets does not produce any benefit to the creditor, and at the same time causes 
irreparable harm to the debtor.  The execution proceedings is, as a principle, aimed at 
collecting the debt, and so it should not harm values or sentiments when they have no 
real benefit to the creditor and are carried out as revenge.  Indeed, in most legal 
systems the list of items that are not attachable are generally of little value, since there 
is no reason to leave the debtor without the minimal elements for subsistence, while 
the benefit to the creditor is practically negligible. 64
62
 See the discussions in the sub-committee of the Law, Justice & Constitution Committee for 
the amendments of the Execution Law from December 10th 1998, p.5. (On file with the author 
- italics not in the original.)  During the discussions for the preparation of the rules in Israel, 
the representative of the Ministry of Justice raised the possibility of granting the Chief 
Execution Officer discretion to attach pet animals in certain cases.  This proposal was not 
expressed in the wording of the Law.
63
 Compare Bar Ophir, supra note 2 at 320 ff.
64
 The power to attach movables of high value is expressly recognized in French Law. See Loi
9-7-1991, sec. 14 (4). In American jurisdictions we find that the protection of movable property 
is limited to certain sums. For example, Vermont legislation protects motor vehicle of the 
debtor not exceeding $2500, professional trade books or tools of the profession not 
exceeding  $5,000 (Rules of Civil procedure, Form 34). In Maryland, property of any kind, 
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These arguments may also be used as a justification for not allowing the attachment of 
animals, and it may be said that the main motivation for the legislation for the 
prohibition of attaching pets, was to prevent superfluous damage to the debtor.  In 
most cases, the market value of pets is insignificant65 or nonexistent.  This is clear in 
the case where the companion animal is a stray cat that was “adopted” by the debtor, 
and the realization thereof will not bring any benefit to the creditor due to its lack of 
market value.  It may even be presumed that if the price of the animal is negligible, 
the creditor will not attach it or at least will not realize the attachment, since the costs 
involved in the realization of the attachment, the holding of the animal, such as 
payment for the removal of the movable objects and their storage, may cause the sale 
to become unprofitable. 
The objections to this argument are that in principle, the lack of market value does not 
always constitute an absolute defence against attachment.  At least in Israel, articles 
that do not appear in the list of section 22 of the Law may be attached even if they 
lack value.  We may even deduce from the lack of value of the articles in the list of 
Execution Regulations that the legislator did indeed expect cases where assets with an 
extremely low price would be attached.66  Furthermore, it is well known, that a 
creditor often imposes attachment, even when he knows in advance that the possibility 
of realizing the asset is almost nonexistent, in order to exert pressure on the debtor.  
Sometimes simply the registration of the article as attachment may bring pressure to 
bear on the debtor, who does not know if the creditor intends to realize the attachment 
or not.67  It can cause the debtor to cooperate with the creditor and to be more 
amenable to an agreement.
according to the election of the debtor, is exempt not exceeding $ 3,000 (Courts and Judicial 
Proceeding Code Ann 11-504). In Oregon, household goods, furniture, radios, television sets 
are exempt of being taken not exceeding $3000, books and pictures not exceeding $600, 
jewelry not exceeding $1,800 and a rifle or shotgun not exceeding $1,000. (Oregon revised 
Statutes, 18. 845). As observed before, in the case of exemption from attachment of animals 
there are also limits to the value of the pet.  
65
 See G. Francione: Animals, Property & the Law, Philadelphia, (1995) p.57.
66
 Regulation 61 (g) of The Execution Regulations 5740-1979 (In Hebrew).
67
 This is clear for example in the case of a Television set. The money the creditor may gain 
by selling the TV is not considerable, but the fact that the Television was attached may bring 
the debtor to try to find ways to achieve some sort of compromise with the creditor, and pay 
the debt.
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From the standpoint of a creditor (perhaps not an overly scrupulous and sensitive 
creditor), the very attachment of a companion animal even if it has not a real value, 
may bring the debtor to pay the debt.  The creditor may attach the pet not because he 
is really interested in “materializing” the value of the animal, but because he finds this 
way useful for “convincing” the debtor to pay the debt.68  If so, the attachment here is 
not aimed at collecting the money, but at exploiting the affection of the debtor 
towards the animal.  Here we have a rather solid justification for the prohibition: The 
attachment should not be admitted, since it shows mala fides,69 or alternatively, it 
constitutes an abuse of the execution proceedings.70  The legislator, balancing the 
interest of the debtor and the creditor, effectively ruled in favour of the debtor, 
wishing to prevent such a situation of a mala fides attachment. 
These arguments may be convincing, but what will be said regarding animals of great 
value?  Can the attachment be justified when the realization of the animal could be of 
benefit to the creditor?  Let us suppose that the debtor has a very expensive bird, or a 
fine Siamese cat, whose market value is over the average value of other artefacts 
owned by the debtor.  Why should attachment be prevented when it involves a 
valuable animal whose market price could justify the attachment proceedings?  This 
question balances market value and sentimental value on the scale, and asks: When 
does one outweigh the other?  Here, unlike the former case, we cannot talk about an 
“abuse” of the attachment procedure or lack of good faith, since the creditor may gain 
substantial revenues from the sale of the animal. 
68
 This happens in rare cases.  However, in discussions of the Law and Justice Committee 
prior to the first reading a case of attachment of a dog was mentioned.
69
 In Israeli law every juristic act should be made according to the principle of good faith, 
according to section 12 and 61 of Contract Law (General Part) 1973.
70
 I use the expression “abuse of rights” in the sense that the Continental law gives to it.  Thus 
for example section 226 of the B.G.B.: “The use of a right is not allowed when there can be no 
other intention of the user than to cause harm to another”.  See also the Italian Civil Code 
section 883, the Spanish Civil Code section 7(2), the Swiss Civil Code, section 2.  The idea of 
abuse of a right is not common in Israel in the context within which I use it and “bona fides” 
may be used as a criterion for the determination of the behavior of the creditor.  In the end the 
idea is similar: not to exploit the attachment proceedings as pressure on the debtor when it is 
known in advance that the realization of the asset will not bring any benefit, but that the injury 
to the debtor is in practice used as a lever to “encourage” him to pay the debt.  In the matter 
of the abuse of a right see A.M. Rabello (ed.): Aequitas and Equity: Equity in Civil Law and 
Mixed Jurisdictions, Jerusalem, (1997) pp.583 ff.
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At this point, we discover the difference between companion animals and other assets 
- objects which are exempt from attachment - a difference that justifies the special 
treatment of pets.  As I have explained before, the legislator usually defines assets that 
cannot be attached, and they are mostly things of no great value.  Even when this 
concerns essential things such as food, the law may determine limits of time – for 
example nutritional needs for the existence of the debtor and his family for a period of 
30 days – as a way to prevent a situation of hoarding beyond the immediate needs of 
the debtor.71  Moreover, even when the legislator does not explicitly determine the 
maximum price of the asset as a basis for immunity, judicial decisions take care to 
sketch the outlines of this matter.  Thus it was decided by the Israeli courts that the 
immunity from attachment for a disabled person’s vehicles should not prevent the 
creditor from attaching expensive vehicles, since a disabled person can make do with 
a vehicle that is of a lesser value.72  A debtor who has no means to pay his debts 
should adapt his level of life accordingly.73
But the same criteria cannot be applied to a pet: no one can compel a person to 
“exchange” his pet for a cheaper one.  As a principle, animals have peculiar value, 
since they are unique and irreplaceable.74  This is what characterizes the uniqueness of 
the animal that finds expression in the sentimental value.  Therefore, the reasons for 
the justification of the exemption should be sought in the importance of subjective 
value vis à vis the market value of the pet.
2. Objective Value  - Subjective Value
Animals are personal property,75 and as property they have value.76  We should 
distinguish between two values that constitute the real value of a pet.  One is the 
71
 See Israeli Law of Execution, sec. 22(a) 1,Italy CPC. Sec. 514 (3) (referring in both cases to 
food for one month).
72
 Civil Appeal 2886/92 in Katavi v. Algov (unpublished) (Hebrew).
73
 In France the owner of a taxi was compelled to sell his uniquely modeled car and buy a 
much more modest one instead.  Tribunal de Fontainebleau, 4-12-1978, cited in Donnier, 
supra note 21 at 91.  
74
 G. Duckler, “The Economic Value of Companion Animals: a Legal and Anthropological 
Argument for Special Valuation”, 8 Animal Law (2002) 199-221 at 203.
75
 See section VII below.
76 Duckler, supra note 66 at 199.
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market value (the objective value) that is the consequences of the characteristics of the 
pet, his breed, uniqueness and so on.  The other component is the subjective value that 
is the outcome of the peculiar relationship developed between the human and his pet.  
The market value of the animal is not only the nominal price at the market or the price 
a similar animal may have, for a series of factors should be taken into account.  For 
example, some American jurisdictions have recognized that market value is also the 
outcome of the prizes the animal has won.77  The market value is only one component 
of the value.  The subjective value, however, has nothing to do with the objective 
characteristics of the animal and it derives from the animal’s contribution to the 
happiness and well being of the animal’s human companion.78  I am aware that it is 
preferable to deal with “subjective value” in a comprehensive way and not refer only 
to the “sentimental value,” since the subjective value of the animal is not only the 
outcome of sentiments.  Thus for example, an animal that has been trained to take part 
in an artistic exhibition, may only exhibit these abilities when it is with its owner.  For 
a third person buying the animal, the value of the animal is only the market value, and 
so the gap between subjective and objective value is clear.  Nevertheless, since, as I 
have pointed out before, the use of pets for entertainment, or commercial activities 
does not weaken the sentimental link between the human and the animal, I will focus 
my analysis on the sentimental value.
As mentioned,79 the attachment could be justified when the market value is reasonably 
high so as to contribute to the paying off of the debt entirely or at least partially.  Thus 
for example, the attachment of a television set is justified only if the selling of the 
television set (according the attachment procedure) affords the creditor a certain 
profit.  To refer to an attachment as justified or not according to the principles of good 
faith, we should base our arguments on the grounds of the relationship between the 
market value and the subjective value of the asset attached.  We could express it as 
follows:
77
 Missouri P. Ry Co. v. Edwards, 14 S.W 2nd, (Ark.) 230, (1929). In the case the animal has 
been harmed. 
78
 J. Raz, “On the Nature of Rights” 93 Mind (1984) 194, 204; Francione, supra note 57 at 
101. 
79
 See section V 1.
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Subjective value    Market value   Justified attachment
Subjective value   Market value    Unjustified attachment 
In this scheme, the market value represents the benefit that the creditor may receive 
from the selling of the animal.  But this market value plays a minor role for the debtor.  
Insofar as the gap between market value and subjective value is greater, the need to 
protect the debtor increases, and in the case of pets the gap is large since the animal 
has a sentimental value difficult to evaluate.80  For those who love animals, the 
sentimental value is always greater than the market value.  By excluding the market 
value and focusing on the sentimental value the law recognizes that the sentimental 
value cannot be estimated in proportion to the market value.  This special relationship 
is also expressed in the investment of the person in the animal over a period of time, 
in treatment, in training, in adaptation of habits, in teaching the animal to recognize 
locations etc.  All this may be destroyed because the animal is removed from the 
person’s vicinity.  There are those who speak of bereavement following the separation 
from the animal;81 The pet is part of the family.82  Incidentally, it is important to note 
this fact for another reason: it should be remembered that the pet, at least on the 
emotional plane, belongs to the entire family,83 and not only to the debtor alone.84  All 
80
 See the decision in France regarding pain and suffering following the death of an animal.
81
 See A. Shalev: The Furry Therapist, Tel Aviv, 1996, p.103 ff. (In Hebrew).
82
 This approach is expressed, for example, in the granting of pain and suffering as damages 
following the death of the animal.  Thus for example in France see S, Antoine: “Le Droit de 
l’Animal: Evolution et Perspectives” in Recueil Dalloz, (1996) chr.126-130 at 129. In USA the 
situation is not so clear since animals are generally still considered property, and in practice 
the damages awards has been minimal as the market value approach. There have been 
some exceptions like case where the injury has been caused due to malicious or willful 
conduct. Some jurisdictions, like Hawaii, recognize recovering for emotional suffering. See 
Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 632 P 2.1066 (Haw. 1981).  See also LaPorte v. 
Associated Independents, Inc, 163 So. 2d. 267 (Fla. 1964). See more generally W. Root, 
“Man’s Best Friend: Property or Family Member? An Examination of the Legal Classification 
of Companion Animals and its Impact on Damages Recoverable for their Wrongful Death or 
Injury”, 47 Vill. Law Review (2002) 423-450. 
83
 “There is no doubt that some pet owners have become so attached to their family pets that 
the animals are considered members of the family,” Johnson v. Douglas, 723 NYS 627 
(2001).  See also Lockett v. Gary Hill, 51 P. 3d. 5 (2002). 
84
 It is commonly accepted that pets “belong” to the children.  This does not only concern a 
clarification of ownership of the animal (as occurs for example when there are articles in the 
home of the debtor that do not belong to him but to his wife or to another person) but the 
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these considerations make the market value irrelevant for being a criterion for 
justifying the attachment.85  Since the sentimental value is greater than the market 
value, the attachment should not be justified.
There is room to complicate this and ask: if the solution is justified with regard to 
pets, then why should this same approach not be used in the treatment of other articles 
that have very great sentimental value to the debtor?  For example, let us say that the 
debtor has a picture that has sentimental value for him.  Here the sentimental value 
does not constitute an impediment to attachment in Israeli law.  Even if we would 
follow the French law, 86 however, which protects objects of sentimental value, such 
as pictures, from attachment, in my opinion, it would still be necessary to distinguish 
between animals and other objects that can have a sentimental value.  Firstly, it is 
clear that it is impossible to depend on the sentimental value that the debtor may 
express with regard to each and every article, since this would empty the entire 
execution process of its content.  Who could prevent the debtor from explaining how 
attached he is to his washing machine or his car?  But even if we consider the cases in 
which certain articles can indeed be of special emotional importance for the debtor, 
there would still be a significant difference between the relationship that a person can 
develop towards an inanimate object and that which he can develop with an animal 
that would justify the distinction.  This difference between a pet and an inanimate 
object is due to the special interaction that is created between the animal and the man, 
an interaction that cannot exist with regard to an inanimate object. 
The attachment of pets should be prohibited not only because it shows a harsh attitude 
of the creditor, who, lacking good faith, may abuse of the animal to collect his money, 
but because it destroys the particular relationship established between the animal and 
the man. The exemption privileges the particular place that a companion animal plays 
understanding of the complex relationship that has evolved between the animal and members 
of the family.
85
 Nevertheless perhaps in very extreme situations for instance when the debtor clearly has 
very expensive pets only for ornamental aims without any sentimental connection, it could be 
possible to authorize the attachment, as it is established in the German law.
86
 As in the case of “souvernirs à caractère personnel et familiar”. Sec. 39 D. 31/7/1992.  
Compare in Germany sec 765 a (1) ZPO, regarding the need of proceedings being done in 
good faith.
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in the life of a person and avoids using emotional pressure to compel the debtor to 
pay.  By recognizing pets as assets that cannot be attached, the legislator abandons the 
utilitarian criterion as a basis for exemption from attachment, and determines that the 
animal is also an essential element in the life of the person. 
But there is yet another aspect that should be analyzed.  It is possible to attempt to 
understand the exemption from a different point of view . . . the point of view of the 
animal.  To what extent does the prohibition of attachment grant a direct right to the 
animal? 
V I .  Pr o t e c t ion  o f  th e  An i mal
The idea, that the animal is exempt from attachment, may be based upon the 
lawmaker’s wish to avoid the suffering of the pet.  As I will explain, however, basing 
the prohibition of attachment upon the suffering of the pet is problematic.  I will cope 
with this problem, and then refer to a more general question: the recognition of rights 
to animals, or more precisely, to what extent can the prohibition of Israeli Law be 
understood as granting a direct right to the pet.  
1. The Suffering of the Animal
We can accept that at least for certain species, to a certain extent (and short of the 
suffering of the owner) the attachment can cause suffering to the animal.  It is enough 
to think about a dog being taken from his home to a confined space without food or 
water or a cat being taken to a place he does not like.  The transportation of the animal 
to the new destination, the condition of the bailment of the pet and the injury to its 
physical and mental health as a consequence of the attachment should be taken into 
account.87  Suffering does not necessarily mean cruel or unreasonable pain,88 and even 
discomfort caused to an animal is a matter that should be prevented and that could be 
87 See Israeli High Court 1684/96  “Let Animals Live” Society v. Hamat Gader Entertainment 
Industries, P.D. 51 (3) 832, 850 for a case of mental suffering.
88
 “Suffering occurs when unpleasant subjective feelings are acute or continue for a long time 
because the animal is unable to carry out the actions that would normally reduce risks to life 
and reproduction in those circumstances.”  M. Dawking, “From an Animal’s Point of View: 
Motivation, Fitness, and Animal Welfare”, 13 Behavioural and Brain Sciences (1990) 1,2 cited  
at M. Radford, Animal Welfare Law in Britain, Oxford, 2001, at 271.
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forbidden by law.89  The attachment would hinder the accepted standards of care due 
to the pet.90 Thus, in the same way that we have referred to the separation from the 
point of view of the debtor, it is also possible to see the separation from the point of 
view of the animal.  If we focus the discussion on the animals that do develop a 
relationship with their owners or to a place, these animals can suffer as a result of the 
separation.91
The argument that the suffering of the animal should be recognized as a reason to 
make the pet exempt from attachment is not free from difficulties.  In the first place it 
may be argued that there are types of animals who cannot form a relationship with a 
man or a place (for example, the case of decorative fish) and who could therefore be 
attached.  Therefore, in order to place the suffering of an animal as the foundation of 
non-attachment we must distinguish between various animals.92
From a strict legal point of view, the Israeli execution law does not propose to deal 
with the suffering of animals.  This aim is covered by the Prevention of Cruelty Law 
(1994) [‘Tza’ar Ba’alei Chaim’ in Hebrew] that prohibits causing maltreatment, 
torture or cruelty to animals, and establishes the mechanism for controlling and 
punishing these practices thereof.93  It could be argued that the fact that a special rule 
is included in the Execution Law intended to prevent attachment of pets indicates that 
the legislator did not believe that attachment should be included in the Law for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (1994), since it does not involve cruelty or abuse.  
The Israeli Law for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals does not explicitly forbid the 
89
 “…[A]lthough ‘discomfort’ is not ‘suffering’, yet the question as to whether an animal in a 
certain case bears literal ‘discomfort’ or whether it suffers and is tormented, is a question that 
will be decided according to the circumstances of each and every case. ‘Discomfort’, 
‘suffering’ and ‘difficult suffering’ are nothing but terms that are located on a scale, and the 
question as to whether ‘discomfort’ becomes suffering or suffering becomes ‘difficult suffering’ 
is not an abstract question but a question to be decided according to the essence of the 
picture of the facts that are spread out before us” Justice Hashin in High Court 1684/96 The 
“Let the Animals Live” Society v. the Hamat Gader Leisure Enterprises, P.D. 51 (3) 832, 850.
90
 Compare  Radford, supra note 88 at 317 ff.
91
 See, E. Pluhar, The Moral Significance of Human & Nonhuman Animals, Durham, (1995), 
p.21. 
92
 See the opinion of Regan who believes that all animals should be related to as equals, T. 
Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, Berkeley, 1983, pp. 239 ff.
93
 The law has established the trustees for the Protection of Animals, who are entitled to bring 
before the competent authorities cases of maltreatment (sec. 7).
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attachment of animals, and thus it could be argued that attachment cannot be seen as 
cruelty or abuse.  This argument is indeed weak, since the Law for Prevention of 
Cruelty to Animals does not include specific rules, but only a general determination 
that does not deal with all the cases of abuse.  The law also does not explicitly forbid 
the killing of animals94 and yet it is clear that the killing of animals – at least killing 
without “a suitable purpose” is within the bounds of a forbidden act.95  The 
distinctions between suitable and unsuitable purpose, lead me to think that it may be 
better to sever the prohibition of the attachment from the suffering of the animal.  I 
will explain this point. 
In Israel, the question of the suffering of animals has received a detailed treatment in 
the Supreme Court decision in the Hamat Gader Case.96  This case involved a request 
by the “Let Animals Live” Society [‘Tn’u LaChiot Lichiot’ in Hebrew] to cancel the 
performance of crocodiles at the leisure park of Hamat Gader because of the suffering 
that this caused the animals.  The High Court allowed the petition, since it considered 
that the commercial performance in Hamat Gader caused an unreasonable and 
unjustified suffering to the crocodiles.  However the Supreme Court refrained from 
deciding that the suffering of the animals constituted a basis for the absolute 
prohibition of all injury to animals.  Indeed, according to this decision, in certain 
circumstances, causing a certain amount of suffering to animals may be within 
justifiable limits.97  The Supreme Court determined that a balance should be made 
between the suffering caused to the animal and the purpose for which the suffering 
was caused, and that it should be ascertained that the means used by man to achieve 
94
 The law prohibits the killing of animals using certain kind of poison (sec. 4).
95
 Thus for example the killing of dogs or cat infected with rabies. See Israeli High Court of 
Justice 6446/96 The Association for Cats v. The Municipality of Arad et al., Takdin-Al 70 (1) 
1142, 1156.  The Hon. Justice Goldberg discussed the ecological consequences of mass 
exterminations of animals, a slightly different matter from individual extermination of an 
animal. This subject deviates from the framework of my article. 
96 Bagatz 1684/96 The “Let Animals Live” Society v. The Hamat Gader Leisure Enterprises, 
P.D. 51 ( 3) 832, 850 [hereinafter, Hamat Gader].
97
 This is the position adopted by the animal welfare theory which condemns “unnecessary” 
suffering of animals. See G. Francione,  “Animal Rights and Animal Welfare”, 48 Rutgers Law 
Review (1995/96) 397-469 at 426 ff.
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this purpose should be suitable means.98  As expressed by the American Judge 
Campbell, quoted by the Israeli Court:
“Not every act that causes pain and suffering to animals is 
prohibited.  Where the end or object in view is reasonable and 
adequate, the act resulting in pain is, in the sense of the statute, 
necessary and justifiable, as where a surgical operation is performed 
to save life, or where the act is done to protect life or property, or to 
minister to some of the necessities of man….”99
This is to say that on the one hand, suffering should not be caused to animals, but at 
the same time, if the suffering brings a benefit to man then it is warranted to allow the 
animal to suffer.100  According to this line of thought, the prevention of the animal’s 
suffering is a function of the benefit that this suffering may bring.  If the benefit is 
great and overrides the suffering, then the suffering of the animal is justified.  
Although when discussing humans we negate the possibility of causing them 
suffering, without any connection to the benefit that may be derived by others, yet 
when animals are involved, the criterion used is utilitarian.101  If we allow animals to 
suffer, the question is by whom and how should the delimitation be determined 
between “permissible” suffering and “forbidden” suffering.102
If we were to use the utilitarian determination of the Israeli court in the Hamat Gader 
case, we might reach a dubious outcome, for if we adopt the distinction between 
purposeful suffering, and non-purposeful suffering we can arrive at the conclusion 
that the interest that is embodied in the execution process – that is to say, the 
98
 Hamat Gader, pp 854.
99
 Hamat Gader, pp 855 (the italics not in the original).
100
 See High Court of Justice 6446/96 The Association for Cats v. The Municipality of Arad et 
al. Takdin 70(1) 1142. Regarding the test for establishing unnecessary suffering in Britain see 
Radford, supra note 88 at 242 ff.
101
 This is what is known as “Kantianism for People – Utilitarianism for Animals”.  See R. 
Nozick, Anarchy, State & Utopia, N.Y., (1974) pp. 35,239 ff.  See also Pluhar, supra note 80 
at 58 ff.; H. Guither: Animal Rights, Illinois, (1998), pp.15 ff.; Francione, supra note 57 at 18 
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collection of the debt – turns the suffering of the animal, whether real or ostensible, 
into a fitting purpose: to bring about the settlement of the debt, where the means used 
is the sale of the animal.  Thus, if the value of the animal brings about payment -even 
partial - of the debt it is possible to consider the suffering of the animal as opposed to 
the benefit that the action would grant to the creditor.  According to this approach, 
expensive animals would be destined to suffer more than inexpensive animals.  As I 
have explained before, this sort of conclusion is hardly acceptable.  But this is not the 
only problematic point we face. 
Focusing the question of pet attachment upon the suffering of the animal may lead to 
a misperception of the whole question, not because the suffering of the animal is not 
important, but because at the bottom line the application of the prohibition of the 
attachment is not a consequence of the suffering of the animal, and I would even say 
that it is independent of it.  But perhaps the prohibition of attachment may be 
understood as the recognition of a direct right of the animal, without relation to its 
suffering.  In other words: could we argue that the protection of the animal is based 
not only on the right of the debtor but also on the right of the pet? 
Using of the suffering of the animal to justify the exemption from attachment may 
cause an outcry particularly among those who defend the rights of animals since they 
will ask why the animal needs to suffer in order for it to receive the right?  Does 
suffering alone entitle it to a right?103  I am not advocating Bentham’s approach that 
affirms that the basis for granting rights to animals is whether they can suffer,104 and 
surely this discussion is beyond the scope of this paper.  However, perhaps we can see 
the pet’s exemption from attachment as a right granted by the law directly to the 
animal.  If the Execution Law forbids the attachment of pets why is it not said that 
there is a right “belonging” also to the animal (and not only to the debtor)?  Could the 
determination of an exemption from attachment for pets mark the abandonment of the 
103
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“homocentric approach”105 and the adoption of a wider approach that sees the animal 
as bearing rights?106
2. The Non-attachment: a Right for Companion Animals?
The issue of the status of animals has occupied many scholars, both legal and 
philosophic.107  Today to think in Descartian terms and to refer to animal as machines 
seems an extremist position.  In some way or another the need to protect animals is 
well accepted.  But the idea of protection may find expression in different approaches. 
Generally, there are two different philosophical lines regarding the question: is the 
protection of animals a consequence of indirect duties towards them or of direct 
duties.  The indirect view recognizes duties towards animals but these duties do not 
translate into rights for animals.  Perhaps the most important exponent of this 
approach is I. Kant108 who asserted that duties to animals are derived from duties to 
human beings since animals are not ends unto themselves.  In more recent times, the 
idea of indirect duties was adopted by philosophers like John Rawls,109 who 
subscribes to what is known as the “contractualist” theory, which bases moral 
obligations upon reciprocity.  Since there is no place for reciprocity between humans 
and animals, there is no place for direct rights of the animals.  The duty not to be cruel 
to the animal does not entail that the animal has the right not to be inflicted by an act 
of cruelty.
The direct duty view finds expression in two different tracks: One is the utilitarian
theory; the other is the inherent value theory.  The Utilitarians, especially those known 
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as “Preference Utilitarians” like Peter Singer,110 accept that humans have direct duties 
towards animals, but these direct duties are not the consequence of the existence of 
rights of the animals but of the need for equal treatment, including the equal treatment 
respecting the desire to live.  The interests of animals are to taken into account (as is 
suitable to an utilitarian approach) in the same way that we take into account the 
interests of humans.  Otherwise we fall into what is called “speciesism,” that is to 
discriminate between men and animals on the basis of the fact that they belong to 
different species exactly in the same way that racism discriminates between people on 
the basis of their race or national identity.  According to Utilitarianism, we achieve 
this aim of equal treatment, fight against exploitation of animals and even defend 
vegetarianism without needing to talk about rights.  In fact, for Singer, the only basic 
right granted to the animal is the right to equal treatment.111
The most important contribution to the recognition of animals as having rights has 
been by Tom Regan.112  Regan belongs to the “direct view” approach, but he criticizes 
the utilitarian approach and argues that animals have an inherent value and that their 
rights are a consequence of the recognition of this inherent value.  Every subject-of-
life has an inherent value and thus has a right not be exploited, irrelevant of utilitarian 
considerations.113  Based upon the distinction between moral agents (those who can 
understand what a moral attitude is and are thus able to act in a moral way) and moral 
patients (those who have not this capability), Regan maintains that moral patients 
(such as animals) have the right to respectful treatment.114  Notwithstanding the 
theoretical differences, the theses of Singer and Regan do not lead to very different 
practical consequences.  In fact both of them support vegetarianism, both of them are 
against animal exploitation like industrial farming.  It is not my aim here to analyze or 
110
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critique these approaches115 but only to deal with the question of the grounding of 
exemption of attachment in the light of the idea of recognizing animal rights.  
Although I feel sympathy to the direct duties theory I think that in reference to the 
prohibition of attachment, the legal situation is better explained by the indirect duties 
theory.
It is clear that it has become increasingly accepted that animals enjoy a special status 
expressed in the creation of legal mechanisms that are intended to ensure their health 
and security.  There is also a growing notion that society or a certain group within the 
society has the right to intervene in order to protect animals, even sometimes in 
opposition to the wishes of their owners.  Today it is increasingly acceptable to relate 
to animals in terms of legal entities,116 expressed for example in international 
documents such as the Declaration of Animal Rights (signed on 15th October 1978 in 
the UNESCO House in Paris),117 or in the Declaration of the European Council 
regarding the protection of animals.118  There are even those who believed in the past 
that it is possible to compare the situation of animals and the situation of certain 
minority groups, for example the blacks,119 immigrants of all types, and even women, 
who, were also thought of as being devoid of rights while today obviously their rights 
115
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are undisputed.  Thus it is argued that full recognition of the rights of animals is only 
a matter of development.120
Recognizing the rights of animals is not tantamount to saying that they have the same 
rights of human beings.  No one will suggest that dogs and cats have the right to be 
candidates for the Senate, to publish their ideas without censure or to freedom of 
religion.  But regarding the attachment of the pet, the dilemma is more complex, and 
in order to decide whether the pet can be said to be entitled to the right not to be 
attached (that is remain at the debtor’s home) we should first understand that we are 
not facing a bilateral relationship (creditor- pet) but a trilateral relationship (creditor-
debtor- pet).  We may see the relationship as a triangle.
Pet
Creditor Debtor
If we accept that, in a strict sense, a right is a claim that has a duty as its correlative,121
in the case of the attachment it is difficult to find the correlative duty.122  There is no 
legal relationship between the animal and the creditor, at least until the attachment is 
realized.  From this moment the creditor or the bailiff that deals with the attachment 
has the general duties of non-cruelty and protection of animals,123 but this relationship 
120
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falls short of the framework of the execution law.  As a principle, the conflict of 
interest is not between the creditor and the pet but between the creditor and the debtor. 
More significant is the relationship between the debtor and pet that provides 
justification for the prohibition. We cannot posit a right of the animal towards the 
debtor (the owner), because the exemption from the attachment is not obligatory and 
the debtor may always decide to attach the animal if he wishes, in the same way that 
he may decide to sell or to give the animal away as a gift.  If indeed the attachment 
causes suffering to the animal and this suffering justifies the prevention of attachment, 
then what should we say if the debtor decides of his own initiative and according to 
his own considerations that the animal should be transferred to the creditor?  Should 
we also argue, here, that this is forbidden?  Certainly not.  From the point of view of 
the pet, the right of the debtor to sell the animal and to transfer him to other owners is 
similar to the attachment situation.  Who could bar the debtor from giving the pet to 
the creditor if by doing so he finds relief from his economic problems?
We should distinguish between two levels.  The first level is the moral level, and the 
second level is expressed in the existing law and its interpretation.124  These two 
levels do not necessarily correspond with one another.  For example, in light of the 
legislation that prohibits cruelty to animals, it could be argued that the law “grants” 
the right to animals not to suffer as a result of cruelty towards them.  So, it could be 
argued that it is immoral to eat meat but not “illegal.”  This means that the animal has 
no legal right to be immune from being eaten.  As opposed to this, it may be also 
argued that it is immoral to use a pet, while causing it to suffer, in order to collect 
money from the debtor.125  I do not think that a creditor who uses the debtor’s pet in 
order to bring pressure to bear upon him, acts in a moral way,126 but this does not 
justify going further and giving the rule a meaning that does not find explicit 
124
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expression in the letter of the law and that in my view, goes beyond the principles the 
legal system is based upon. 
It is worthwhile to keep in mind one of the well-known theories used to negate the 
theory of animal rights, the “choice theory of rights.”  Accordingly, in order to be a 
holder of rights one must choose between different situations and be able to enforce 
that choice.  “A” has a right regarding “B” if and when “A” has the choice to demand 
from “B” that he behave in a certain way and to enforce that behaviour.  According to 
this criterion, animals cannot be seen as having rights, since they do not have the 
choice to enforce the ”right” that is owed to them, only a man can do so.127  Although 
I am not sure that this theory is suitable in every case, I must say at least regarding 
attachment, I find that the theory of choice of rights describes the situation as is:  In 
the case of exemption from attachment, the pet cannot, indeed, oppose the attachment, 
and therefore it cannot be seen as possessing a right.128  This is not the case of cruelty, 
where the law grants a right to the animal that can be enforced through the public 
authority which has the means to stop the suffering and to punish the one who caused 
it.129  In the case of attachment, the animal has no legal defence; the “choice” is only 
of the debtor.
I would like to stress again that I do not reject the recognition of rights to animals.  
We should not negate the possibility that they could have rights, unless we use the 
presumption that only human beings have rights, something known as “speciesism” as 
I explain before.  I think that when the law prohibits acts of cruelty against an animal, 
the law grants it a right.130  I may even support the idea that it would be desirable that 
127
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the very prohibition of attachment should be recognized as a direct right of the animal.  
But when this is translated to a legal formula it clashes with the existing law that does 
not allow me to arrive to this conclusion.  I think that at least regarding the question of 
attachment it is better to understand the protection of the animal according to the 
indirect duty theory, that is to see the protection of the animal as a consequence of the 
protection of the sentiments of the debtor.131  The animal enjoys the right that the law 
bestows on the person – the debtor, and therefore at least in this case, it is incorrect to 
talk about the right of the animal.  At the most, the “right” of the animal is not direct 
but indirect.132
Some have claimed not that the companion animal has a right not to be attached, but 
rather that there is an “interest” not to be attached and consequently be sold by the 
creditor.133  But this distinction is rather semantic.  Furthermore, similar deliberations 
to those concerning the matter of the rights of animals could arise with regard to the 
interests of the animal: is the interest that of the animal or that of the man? And what 
is the difference between saying that the animal has no right to be exempt from 
attachment but that it has an interest? The interests are not those of the animal as 
opposed to those of the person but the opposing interests of people: the creditor and 
the debtor. 
Let us return to the question of suffering.  As I pointed out previously, when a creditor 
wants to attach a companion animal, this attachment will be affected by two legal 
frameworks: one, the protection against attachment given by the execution law, and 
the other, in the case the attachment is carried out (for example in the case the 
“moral patient”.  Only a human being can be defined as a moral agent but this does not 
prevent other creatures (moral patients) from being entitled to moral treatment. The human 
being also has moral responsibility to those of a difference moral status.
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exception is not invoked by the debtor) and it causes suffering to the animal, the
application of the Anticruelty legislation.  If the purpose of the lawmaker was to avoid 
suffering to the animal, there was no need for a particular rule within the framework 
of the Execution Law.  There is no need to link the suffering of the animal to the 
exemption of the attachment because the right to avoid this “suffering” does not 
belong to the animal but to the owner.134  The legislator did not intend to prevent the 
seizure of the pet from the possession of the debtor in every case, but to prevent the
creditor from using the pet as a means for collection of the debt or even worse than 
this, as a means for putting pressure on the debtor.  The law grants the right to the 
“debtor” not to lose the special relationship, which has been woven between himself 
and the animal, as a result of his difficult financial situation.  The suffering of the 
animal – that is important in itself in other contexts – cannot have a role within the 
framework of the execution processes, inasmuch as pets are considered the private
property of the person.
And it is precisely at this point that we see the importance of the rule being included 
in the Execution Law.  While it can hardly be understood as granting direct rights to 
the pet, it does contribute to taking the animal outside the traditional and narrow 
framework of personal property.  The consequence of the prohibition of attachment of 
pets is to strengthen a trend that is becoming increasingly accepted regarding animals: 
that we should not refer to them as chattel.
V I I .  An i mal s  a s  Pr o pe r t y
Companion animals have, since ancient times, constituted a subject for legal 
protection, not because of feelings of compassion, but because of them being the 
subject of property.135  Even in the Bible we see that animals were thought of as 
assets.136  In the Jewish Talmud there are many discourses on animals as the subject of 
ownership.137  The Romans not only distinguished between wild animals and animals 
134
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in private ownership,138 but even distinguished between animals intended for 
agricultural work (cattle, horses) and other animals.  I do not know what the extent of 
affection was of scholars such as the Medieval Grotius or Puffendorf toward animals, 
but when they debated questions concerning animals this was done in context of 
discussions concerning their ownership.139  It seems natural that when we open a 
Code that was written in the 19th century we see that animals are defined as chattel or 
even as real estate.140  The characterization of animals as property has been used as a 
justification for exploitation of animals.  Today this view is gradually being 
abandoned.141  The change in the legal conception of animals as property is a 
consequence of a change in the understanding of the status of the animal in society, 
and of changing philosophical ideas.  
Specifically in the American doctrine there is a strong trend towards abandoning the 
conception of the animals as property.  This trend even finds judicial expression, as in 
the recognition of emotional distress in the case of wrongful damage to a pet.142
Animal protectors battle fervently in order to negate or to make exceptions to the 
status of animals as property; They claim that only when we cease to see animals as 
property, will we provide the animals with suitable protection,143 and reduce the 
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suffering of animals.144  Just now this is only a theoretical approach that is not even 
unanimously accepted.  I am not convinced that it is necessary to stop considering 
animals as property in order to protect them and in order to grant them a special 
status, however this discussion goes beyond the scope of this article.  Perhaps in the 
future, the characterization will be different and there will be broad consensus as to 
the fact that seeing animals as property jeopardize their lives.  Just now animals are
accepted by all the legal systems as human property.  But admitting that animals are 
property is not tantamount to say that they are “merely” property.145
As is known, the right of ownership is associated with three features with regard to 
property: the ability to use the object (jus utendi), to enjoy its fruits (jus fruendi), and 
to perform any act to dispossess it (jus disponendi) including the destruction of the 
object (jus abutendi).146  With regard to this last feature, this right does not appear 
with regard to animals, and especially not with regard to pets.  The power to eliminate 
an asset – an inherent right of ownership – does not exist for animals, because of the 
legislation that prevents cruelty.147  The right of the animal not to suffer exists without 
any correlation to the will of the man, who is not entitled to abuse any animal, 
including animals that are owned by him.  In Israel, the law determines a prohibition 
of animal abuse and procedures for the transfer of the animal to a safe place148
(‘mitkan mugan’ in Hebrew) in the case where abuse exists.  Although these 
limitations (as important as they may be) do not constitute a basis for negating the 
notion of ownership with regard to the animal, they afford the animal a particular 
status. 
The notion of ownership should not be assimilated to a complete dominion unlimited 
over animals, and it is not at odds with the recognition of its particular status.149 In 
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comparative law, we find examples of this trend: There is a new definition in the 
German Code, according to which animals are not within the bounds of an object 
[sache] and they are entitled to special protection.150  A similar solution can be found 
in the Austrian law.151  It is clear that an animal should not be treated as an inanimate 
asset: it is a living creature, with whom the man develops a special relationship, and it 
cannot therefore be equated with the inanimate and in this sense it cannot be thought 
of as an object – however valuable the latter may be.  As was determined by the court 
of New York in a well-known judgment regarding animals: “A pet is not just a thing 
but occupies a special place somewhere in between a person and a piece of personal 
property.”152
At this point we see the contribution made by Amendment 19 of the Israeli Execution 
Law: the recognition of the special status of animals, and especially of the special 
status of pets.  In addition to the protection of the sentiments of the debtor, the 
prohibition of attachment constitutes an additional stepping-stone, although a modest 
one, towards a revised characterization of the animal as the subject of ownership, that 
prevents relating to it as an object.  In other words, instead of saying that pets are 
included in the list of objects that are exempt from attachment, it is more correct to 
say that pets cannot be attached because they should not be seen as “just” chattel.  It 
is noteworthy that in Germany, the prohibition of attachment was included in a 
separate section, following the list of articles that are exempt from attachment, 153 and 
thus the inclusion of the animal as part of the list of “chattel” was prevented.  Even if 
this determination is symbolic, it constitutes recognition of the unique status of 
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animals.  Concern for animals should be expressed in various legal frameworks even 
if the rule is bereft of real practical value, and its greatest importance is in the 
evaluative or symbolic level.  Even in Israel, despite the inclusion of the rule in a list 
of objects, the prohibition of section 22(6) can be interpreted as a stepping-stone in 
the construction of a new attitude towards pets – and towards animals in general – as a 
special type of asset. 
By excluding pets from the list of articles to be attached, the Israeli Execution Law 
stresses the importance of animals in our lives and emphasizes an additional facet, 
according to which it is not possible to relate to animals as objects.  Between those 
who wish to see animals as a legal entity in all matters and those who believe that 
there is no reason to abandon the traditional perception that viewed animals as 
property in every sense, it is possible to find a compromising view that is beneficial to 
animals, even if it is not an overarching solution.  Amendment 19 of the Israeli 
legislation is a step in this direction. 
I n  Con c lus i on
As I have noted, in my opinion, the importance of the prohibition of attachment of 
pets is twofold.  Firstly, protection of the sentiments of the debtor and his family 
members, based on it being unsuitable to use execution procedures in order to oppress 
the debtor without producing any benefit.  No less important, the Amendment pays 
tribute to the importance of pets in the family, and in this way the Israeli legislator 
contributes - although it is a modest contribution – to the granting of a special legal 
status to animals.
I have attempted to demonstrate that the exemption of pets from attachment protects, 
first and foremost, the debtor; but the consequences of the rule with regard to the legal 
status of the animal need not be ignored.  The legislator abandoned the narrow
approach that had characterized him for many years in his determination of a list of 
immune assets, and at the same time he ensured the correct definition of the animal as 
property with unique features.
The legislator should be congratulated for considering this seemingly minor issue that does, 
however, have ethical and emotional consequences, and gives increased recognition to the 
importance of the animal in society, especially in the context of the Execution Law that was 
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considered to be only a “technical” law.  The analysis of this rule diverges from the plane of 
debtor-creditor relationships and gives us an opportunity to discuss abstract ideas such as the 
nature of a right, the value of human emotions and the suffering of animals.  In the end, this is 
further evidence - if such was necessary – that the legal text cannot be separated from other 
contexts.
The construction of a theory of animal laws, brick by brick, is required in order to provide 
protection for the animals.  The theory of animal laws must be built on different levels, 
philosophical, ethical and of course legal.  The legal status of the animal will be constructed 
in light of various rules that are dispersed throughout the legal system.  The correct 
relationship to the animals will be the result of special legislation that is intended to protect 
them.  However, at the same time, wide observation of many areas of the law, where animals 
are involved, can create a generalized and balanced picture with regard to the question: how 
do we relate to animals.                                                                                                               
The prohibition of attachment of pets emphasizes the need to continue to deepen the 
discussion regarding human dignity and the balance of interests involved therein.  The 
granting of suitable respect to animals will eventually empower a broader discussion 
concerning the basic rights of society and will make us more aware of the need for man to 
respect all creatures.
